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2.  Country Endowments, Policymakers and Lax Financial Regulation.  A 
Simple Model 
 
To design the key elements of our approach, we shall use a very simple model, in 
order to present the economic intuitions in a compact and casual framework. Our 
goal is to discuss the possible relationships between specific country features, 
policymaker payoff maximization and lax financial regulation against money 
laundering, highlighting the key variables of the problem.  
Let us assume that a policymaker is aware that a potential demand for money 
laundering exists on the part of one or more criminal or terrorist organizations10, 
for a total amount equal to W.  We analyze a situation in which the international 
market for money laundering is demand-driven, as it is likely to be in the real 
world. Therefore every potential lax regulation jurisdiction is a relatively "small 
country". 
The policymaker can decide to launder an amount of money equal to Y, where, of 
course, 0<Y<W. For the sake of simplicity in our model, the decision on the 
optimal level of money laundering services is equivalent to the choice of the 
optimal degree laxity in financial regulation. Calling U the payoff function of the 
policymaker, it is obvious that the expected payoff from unlaundered liquidity is 
zero, whatever the amount: 
 
0)( =- YWU     (1) 
 
On the other hand  every dollar (or euro?)11 laundered can have a positive expected 
value for the policymaker, if his country, given scarce natural resources,   derives 
benefits from offering financial services that facilitate money laundering. In 
particular, we can intuitively assume that the lower the national income and the 
                                                                 
10 For a general microeconomic analysis of the money laundering demand see Masciandaro 
(1996) and  (1998). For the peculiar relationship between money laundering demand and tax 
evasion see Yaniv (1994) and (1999); see also Alldridge (2001). 
11 For the use of dollar or euro in the black economy, see Boeschoten and Fase (1992), 
Rogoff (1997), Sinn and Westermann  (2001). 
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higher the proportion of that income that depends on the financial industry, the 
greater will be the propensity to offer money laundering services, all other things 
being equal. In general, let us to define those expected benefits as laxity national 
benefits.  
To be more precise, the fact that the laundered money provides an expected profit 
for the policymaker may be captured by imagining that the monetary value B of 
this benefit is equal to: 
 
mYB =     (2) 
 
Where m >0  is the  expected net rate of return on the money laundering services 
offered (i.e. on the degree of laxity) by the country. The inflow of black and grey 
foreign capital produces national revenues, increasing the activity of the financial 
industry and then throughout the traditional macroeconomic multiplier effects12. 
On the contrary, the implementation of a severe regulation against money 
laundering in the same country generates high compliance costs13. The role of the 
financial industry represents an economic endowments that determine the 
policymaker choices.  
 If the decision to launder were cost-free, it would be a trivial matter to see that we 
shall have Y = W.  But things are not that simple.  
First of all, policymakers may face international reputation costs. To be more 
attractive to criminal or terrorist organizations, a country must make  legislative and 
regulatory choices that increase its credibility as a lax financial regulation (LFR) 
jurisdiction14. These choices may carry a reputation cost, however, since being an 
LFR jurisdiction may cause negative repercussions, whether in relation to capital, 
intermediaries and companies sensitive to integrity or to international relations in 
general. In fact, we have to acknowledge the possibility that under-regulation may 
be as unattractive for some legal investors as over-regulation15. As we noted in the 
Introduction, the existence of the international reputation costs represents the 
rationale for the blacklisting device. 
Secondly, a policymaker must consider that laundering money means 
strengthening internal organized crime or terrorism, i.e. there may be national 
crime and terrorism costs. Policymakers have to consider the possibility that 
domestic social damage may derive from the fact that the country may became a 
                                                                 
12 For a macroeconomic analysis of the interrelationships between money laundering, 
banking industry, legal and illegal economic sectors see Masciandaro (2000). For the 
peculiar vulnerability of securities markets see Jayasuriya (2003). 
13 Masciandaro  (1999). 
14 Masciandaro and Portolano (2003). 
15 The inflow of legal capital can be assumed as negatively correlated with financial laxity, 
because of two main effects: 1) in the legal financial sector, competition is distorted and 
the allocative efficiency of the market is undermined because of extreme financial laxity 
(competition effect); and 2) legal customers may fear a loss of reputation by locating their 
business in a country highly suspected for money laundering (reputation effect). See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1988). 
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possible growth engine for illegal organizations. It is obvious, on the other hand, 
that the less the country registers the actual or potential presence of criminal or 
terrorist organizations internally, the lower the policymaker will perceive the costs 
of crime to be. The level of criminal and terrorism risk is a peculiar social 
endowment that influences the policymaker decisions.  
Within our framework, we do not separate expected crime costs from expected 
terrorism costs. From the theoretical standpoint, we prefer to stress the different 
sensitivity of the policymaker to expected international costs and expected national 
costs, based on a clearly different political cost-benefits analysis. Furthermore, for 
each country, it should not be difficult to introduce in expression (3) a specific 
parameter for each expected national cost factor. 
Therefore the overall cost C of offering money laundering for a policymaker will 
consist of two parts. First, let us assume that the reputation cost is proportional—
according to a parameter c >0—to the amount of money he is asked to launder. 
Secondly, there will be a crime or terrorism cost whose expected value rises as the 
amount of laundered money increases, by a multiple of the parameter g > 0.  Let us 
assume that for political-electoral reasons the policymaker, all other things being 
equal, is more sensitive to the crime and/or terrorism costs, which can weigh 
directly on the country's citizens, than to the international reputation costs, whose 
effect on the citizens-voters is probably less perceptible and direct.  We have: 
 
YcYC 2g+=     (3) 
 
Finally, we must consider that being a lax financial regulation jurisdiction could be 
an increasing source of economic, political and social risk for the international 
community as a whole. Therefore, when policymakers decide whether and to what 
extent to institute a financial regulatory design that will in essence offer money 
laundering services, they must consider that this activity is risky, since presumably 
the international community might consider it a bad policy, perhaps even 
prohibited, and as such subject to sanctions and punitive countermeasures.  
Let us assume, therefore, that offering de facto money laundering services may 
bring with it an international sanction, with an equivalent monetary value of S, and 
a probability p that this conduct will be discovered by the international community 
and thus sanctioned. The probability p can be defined as the degree of technical 
enforcement of the international stigma. Let us call these risks the expected 
international sanction costs. Our model can thus contemplate in the simplest way 
the possibility that the international community will issue explicit sanctions against 
the LFR country16. 
The monetary value of the damage from sanctions S against the money laundering 
must at least equal the value Y of the laundered money. In reality, the damage from 
a sanction is certainly a multiple, because of the value of the intangible non 
economic damage related to such an international sanction. So we can assume that 
                                                                 
16 Sanctions and enforcements characterized the classic a’ la Becker approach: Becker 
(1968). 
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the amount of the international sanction is a multiple of the “laundry” volume, 
equal, for simplicity of computation, to the square of that sum.  
And we should also consider that once the crime is recognized, the international 
community would apply the sanction with a varying degree of severity, based on 
its own political cost-benefit analysis. The rapidity and procedure for applying the 
punishment may vary, affected by national or international structural variables; this 
severity with which the sanction is applied (or the degree of international political 
enforcement)17 can be captured by variations in the parameter t : 
 
2tYS =     (4) 
 
Thus the dilemma of choice facing a policymaker is the following: if I design lax 
financial regulations that favor the offering of money laundering services, and the 
international community does not sanction it, the benefit for the country is positive, 
net of the expected cost associated with international reputation costs and national 
crime and terrorism risks. If, on the other hand, the LFR country is hit by an 
explicit international sanction, it will not only sustain the relative costs but will 
also be damaged by the international sanction. This game is the classic interaction 
between the policymaker and Nature, given that we assume the "small country" 
hypothesis. 
The policymaker, modeled as a risk-neutral agent, is thus faced with the problem 
of deciding whether and how much to launder, i.e. defining the optimal level of 
laxity. The optimal policy is not derived by any social utility function but is just the 
result of the policymaker’s maximizing process, based on his own political cost-
benefits analysis.  
The policymaker's expected payoff E can now be better specified as: 
 
( )( ) ( )[ ]SCpCBpUE +---= 1)(   (5) 
 
But since we have defines B = m Y and C = c Y + 2g  Y,  then 5) becomes: 
 
 ( ) ( ){ } ( )2221 tYYcYpYcYmYpUE ++----= gg    (6) 
 
Therefore It is possible to define the policymaker’s optimal level of laxity, 
depending , coeteris paribus, on the structural parameters of the model, that 
represent  specific country endowments . 
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17 Rider (2002) noted that, in the field of financial regulation, international monetary policy  
has been  susceptible to political considerations. 
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Y* represents the optimal level of money laundering supply services, which is 
equivalent to the optimal degree of financial regulation laxity. Let us observe that 
for Y* > 0 it must be ( ) 21 g--- cpm >0 , i.e. the factor of expected benefit 
from the money-laundering activity, considering the probability of an international 
sanction, is greater than the sum of the reputation and crime and terrorism cost 
factors. Let us define this condition as the laxity condition. 
 
Now we can evidence the relationships with the structural variables of the model 
for the optimal level of laxity. Firstly, the optimal offering of money laundering 
will be inversely proportional to the probability of international sanctions: 
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Secondly, the laxity of financial regulation is affected by the severity of the 
international community in applying the sanction:  
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The laxity of financial regulation will also depend on the profitability of offering 
money-laundering services: 
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Furthermore, we can express the relationship between the reputation cost of 
money-laundering operations and the amount of money to be laundered : 
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Finally, the money-laundering activity of the LFR country will also depend on the 
expected crime and terrorism costs, represented by the parameter g : 
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3. Lax Financial Regulation and Non Co-Operative Countries: An Empirical 
Investigation 
 
In the previous paragraph we illustrated the following relationship in a formal 
framework: given the specific structural features and endowments of his own 
country, a policymaker may find it rational to design lax financial regulations in 
order to attract capital of illegal origin.  
The policymaker finds it advantageous to transform his country into an LFR 
jurisdiction because, in defining its objective function, the national economic 
benefits expected from offering money-laundering services are greater than the 
expected national costs associated with the internal risk of developing terrorism 
and organized crime, the international risk of loss of reputation and, finally, the 
possibility of a sanction by the international community. Therefore, peculiar 
economic and social country endowments can increase the probability of having 
lax financial regulation. 
Now, how we can test this relationship? In the real world, the international 
community considers LFR countries as potential non-cooperative jurisdictions 
(NCCTs) in the fight against money laundering. Therefore we can assume that the 
NCCT jurisdictions share common structural features; we can test this hypothesis 
using econometric techniques.  
In particular, since the international context (i.e. the technical and political 
enforcement described in our model) is constant, we can assume that:  
 
·  An NCCT jurisdiction will be one that, in terms of economic 
characteristics, has relatively scant physical resources to spend in 
international trade, and that this is the first channel of national benefit  
expected from lax  financial regulation ;  
· At the same time, an NCCT jurisdiction has the potential for developing 
financial services, fundamental for money-laundering purposes, and this is 
the second channel of national benefit expected from lax financial 
regulation ; 
· An NCCT jurisdiction also has social characteristics that shield it to some 
extent from the risks of terrorism and/or of organized crime, thus reducing 
the expected cost of lax financial regulation; 
 
Now the time has come to analyze the NCCT jurisdictions. Since 22 June 2000, the 
FATF has been publishing a periodic report on the NCCT jurisdictions: the 
blacklist. The report lays down 25 criteria, plus eight recent special 
recommendations on terrorist financing, that, if violated, identify the national rules 
that in each country are detrimental to international cooperation in the fight against 
money laundering. From June 2000 to February 2004, 45 countries have been 
